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tJUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIAINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND WLAM G. HALE
APPEAL AND ERRoR.
State v. Ricks (Idaho), 180 Pac. 257. Effect of impossibility of obtaining
a transcript of testimony in trial court.
Appellants were convicted of crime in the district court, and thereafter
took the usual proceedings to have their case heard in this court on appeal;
but the court reporter died without preparing a transcript of the testimony
adduced at the trial. It is shown that a transcript of the testimony cannot
be obtained. They have filed a motion in this court for an order to set
aside the judgment of conviction and grant them a new trial on the ground
that they cannot be heard on appeal from the judgment rendered.
Held, that the court has no power to grant the motion, in the exercise of
either its appellate or original jurisdiction as conferred by Const. art. 5, sec. 9.
.Chapman v. State (Ga.), 98 S. E. 243. Effect of comment on facts by
trial court.
Althought the evidence demands a verdict of guilty, the law commands
that it be set aside. The trial judge should have kept dumb, as the statute
requires. It was not at all essential to his ruling upon the motion made by
counsel for defendant for him to express himself on the facts as he did. We
are enjoined in mandatory terms to set this conviction aside. Mandatory
statutes must be obeyed, not evaded.
While, ordinarily, it is reversible error for a trial judge, in any case, in
his charge of the jury, or during its progress, within the hearing of the
jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
proved (Civ. Code, 1910, Sec. 4863; Pen. Code, 1910, Sec. 1058), it is
not a violation of the statute, where such expression or intimation of opinion
occurs when the judge is discussing with counsel the admissibility of testimony,
the propriety of a non-suit, the discharge of a defendant for the lack of
evidence to convict, the direction of a verdict, or similar matters in the progress
of the trial, or is explaining his rulings upon questions of this nature. Es-
pecially is this true where the party complaining of such expression is. the one
who invoked the ruling which occasioned it.
Stephens, J., dissenting.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Ex parte Dunkerton (Kans.), 179 Pac. 347. State penal farm.
The purpose of the act of 1917 is to ameliorate the condition of women
who have been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment. Under
the act women are not subject to the debauching influence of the county jail
and of the penitentiary and of the close confinment therein, but are placed in
a field where labor is pleasant and restraint is limited, and where the evil
influence of other persons convicted of crime is minimized. The act seeks
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to improve, to educate, and to build up, not to punish. The court is asked to
say that the law is unconstitutional because in accomplishing these objects it
imposes restraint on women different from that imposed on men. Morgai V.
State, 179 Ind. 300, 101 N. E. 6, is cited by the petitioner. There, the Supreme
Court of Indiana held that a statute which prescribed a treatment of men
acquitted of crime on the ground of insanity, different from that accorded
women thus acquitted, denied to women the equal protection of the law, and
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The reasoning in that case is not convincing. The legislature may
very properly determine that women convicted of crime shall be less severely
punished than men convicted of the same crime. The number of women that
commit crimes is much smaller than the number of men committing similar
crimes, and that fact may be taken into consideration by the legislature, and
punishment may be prescribed which recognizes that difference.
Chapter 298 of the Laws of 1917, establishing a state industrial farm for
women, does not violate section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States nor section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Con-
stitution of the State of Kansas, and does not deny the equal protection of the
law to women convicted of offenses punishable by imprisonment.
Barbour v. Georgia, 39 Sup. Ct. Repr. 316. Illegal possession of intoxicat-
ing liquors.
The application of Laws, Ga. (Ex. Sess.), 1915, pt. 1, tit. 2, secs. 16 and 30,
making it illegal to have in possession more than one gallon of vinous liquor,
to the possession of liquor acquired after the law was enacted, but before
it became effective, does not render that act invalid as depriving of property
without due process of law.
Frohwerk v. U. S., 39 Sup. Ct. Repr. 249. Espionage act: Freedom of
speech.
Articles published in German language newspaper relative to Wall Street's
having forced country into European war, to England's controlling the coun-
try, and to the draft as a measure it was excusable to resist, held to furnish
basis for conviction of writer on count charging conspiracy between him and
another, both having been engaged in preparation and publication of newspaper,
to violate Espionage Act, June 15, 1917, section 3 (Comp. St. 1918, sec. 10212c).
First Amendment to Constitution, while prohibiting legislation against free
speech, as such, cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give
immunity for every possible use of language.
CONTEMPr.
Ex parte Hudgings, 39 Sup. Ct. Repr. 337. Power to punish.
That perjury is a crime, for which one committing it may be tried and
punished, does not prevent it, when committed in the presence of a court,
being the subject-matter of.punishment for contempt; exceptional conditions
justifying.
While power to punish for contempt committed in the presence of the
court, existing within the limits of and sanctioned by the Constitution, is not
controlled by the limitations of the Constitution as to modes of accusation
and methods of trial generally safeguarding the rights of the citizen, judicial
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authority is not exempt from constitutional limitations; the great and only
purpose of the power being to secure judicial authority from obstruction in
the performance of its duties to the end that means appropriate for the
preservation and enforcement of the Constitution may be secured.
An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty from an act done in
the presence of the court is essential to power to punish for contempt, though
the act be perjury.
Mr. Justice Pitney dissenting.
ESPIONAGE AcT.
Debs v. U. S., 39 Sup. Ct. Repr. 252. Obstructing recruiting.
Defendant, indicted for obstructing and attempting to obstruct the draft,
having just before his speech, complained of, stated that he approved of the
Socialist Anti-War Proclamation and Program, adopted af St. Louis in April,
1917, which recommended opposition by all means to the war, it was admissible
as evidence that, if in his speech he used words tending to obstruct recruiting,
he meant that they should have that effect.
If a purpose of defendant's speech, even though incidental, was, as the
jury were warranted in finding, to oppose, not only war in general, but the
existing war, and the opposition was so expressed that its natural effect
would be to obstruct recruiting, and that was intended, and in all the cir-
cumstances would be its probable effect, .it would not be protected by reason
of it being part of. a general program and expressions of a general and con-
scientious belief.
FORGEY.
McIntosh v. State (Ga.), 98 S. E. 555. Materiality of figures in check.
For an alteration of a writing to be the basis of a prosecution for
forgery the alteration must be a material one.
(a) "The figures in a check, following the words in the body thereof
denoting the sum called for, are not a material part of the instrument, the
words being controlling in determining the legal effect."
HAMuUsON DRUG Act.
U. S. v. Dorems, 39 Sup. Ct. Repr. 214. Validity.
Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, Section 2 (Comp. St. Sec. 6287h), aiming
to confine, by imposition of penalties, sales of narcotic drugs to registered
dealers, to those dispensing them as physician and those coming to dealers
with legitimate prescriptions of physicians, inserted in an act specifically pro-
viding for the raising of revenue, by excise tax on such dealers and others
named in section 1 (sec. 6287g), has such relation to facilitating the collec-
tion of the revenue as to be within the power of Congress under the author-
ity given it by Const. art. 1, sec. 8, to impose excise taxes, and is not a mere
attempt to exercise a power not delegated, the reserved police power of the
states.
The chief justice, Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Van Deventer, and
Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting.
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INSANITY.
People v. Morisawa (Calif.), 179 Pac. 888. Irresistible impulse.
In order to establish defense of insanity in a criminal prosecution, it must
be proved by preponderance of evidence that at time of committing act accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of mind, temporary
or otherwise, as not to know nature and quality of act he was doing, or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong; and an
irresistible impulse to commit an act which one knows is wrong or unlawful
does not constitute the insanity which is a legal defense.
